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Although our federal, state, and local governments in the United States have 
developed effective laws and policies to reduce the number of motor vehicles stolen, 
these policies have largely failed to address the problem of the number of vehicles that 
are stolen and exported each year. There is increasing evidence that there are links 
between organized crime groups and terrorist organizations in the stolen-vehicle export 
business.  
This thesis uses the case study of the New York City Police Department’s 
(NYPD) efforts to curb illegal exportation of stolen vehicles to explore the scope of the 
problem at one of our nation’s largest ports (the Port of New York and New Jersey). The 
key question that framed this research was: Do these policy insights from the NYPD case 
study point to more general policy changes that would make it more difficult for criminal 
enterprises to export stolen vehicles? 
This research suggests a number of national policy changes would positively 
impact the illegal exporter advantage. These policy changes would provide more 
consistency in titling of motor vehicles, increase inspections of exports, and enhance 
enforcement capabilities. Unfortunately, this thesis was unable to establish a clear link 
between stolen vehicle exports, organized crime, and terrorist use of these stolen 
vehicles. Even so, data on this topic is scarce, but there is enough to suggest that further 
research into other case studies could develop data to shed more light on a possible 
connection. In any case, the findings of this thesis indicate more research would be 
worthwhile, as the stolen vehicle market is the most lucrative illicit market behind the 
drug market, and a better understanding could only benefit law enforcement’s efforts to 
counter it.  
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The protection of our homeland requires the United States to be vigilant on many 
fronts, and one area in need of immediate attention is the exporting of stolen motor 
vehicles. This thesis examines threats posed by the loopholes in the current motor vehicle 
export system, particularly stolen vehicles for export, through the lens of one large urban 
police department, the New York City Police Department (NYPD). This thesis identifies 
vulnerabilities and inadequacies in the export system, which criminal enterprises exploit, 
and it offers solutions to address the shortcomings. At the very least, homeland security 
agencies at all levels of government should address the need to increase the number of 
outbound containers examined at ports, enhance scrutiny of freight forwarders, and 
address the disparity between import and export inspections. At the national policy level, 
the United States should enhance the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System 
so that titling agencies in all states can instantly and accurately verify the information on 
a paper title for authenticity with that of what is electronically stored from the  
state-issued title.  
In this thesis, the literature review examines how public policies and federal 
agencies, like U.S. Customs and Border Protection, have inadvertently created loopholes 
for criminals to steal and then ship these vehicles from large U.S. ports. The case study 
demonstrates that even a local law enforcement agency as large as the NYPD is 
challenged to adequately address this problem. Also, the literature review reveals the 
need to better assess the size of the exported-stolen-vehicle problem and its impact on 
international crime and international terrorism. This research was hindered by the 
daunting fact of inadequate knowledge regarding the total number of stolen vehicles 
taken illegally across U.S. borders. Enforcement agencies have data on vehicles 
recovered, but vehicle recovery data is only a proxy measure.  
This research corroborates the need for systems-level change but emphasizes 
programmatic changes that can be implemented at all levels of government. It also 
highlights the need for consistency in national policies regulating the exportation of 
motor vehicles. These programmatic and policy changes can be viewed as 
 xiv 
recommendations, and if implemented, could provide assurances that stolen  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
In 1992, Congress passed tougher laws and penalties for auto theft by enacting the 
Anti Car Theft Act (Title 18, United States Code, 2119). This legislation was intended to 
deter the trafficking of stolen vehicles and increase the penalties for carjackings. The 
primary motivation for this was the large increase in motor vehicle thefts that occurred 
between 1984 and 1990; they increased from 830,000 to 1,270,000.1 A summary report 
prepared for Congress in 1998 to document the effects of the 1992 act notes, “While 
effectiveness still cannot be proved with statistical confidence, the laws do seem to have 
led to an improvement in prosecuting and convicting auto thieves.”2 
There has also been some suspicion that stolen vehicles are being used to fund 
terrorism and quite possibly used to transport dangerous explosives for acts of terrorism.3 
There is increasing evidence that there are links between organized crime groups and 
terrorist activities, some of which involves the use of diaspora networks.4 According to 
officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), they believe stolen vehicles, bought 
and sold on the international black market, “help fund criminal operations and can be 
turned into the terrorist weapon of choice against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians.”5 There 
is discussion concerning terror funding and attempts to counter the financing of terrorism 
in the upcoming chapters. 
                                                 
1 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Auto Theft and Recovery: Effects of the Anti Car 
Theft Act of 1992 and the Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984 (Washington, DC: National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1998), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/View 
Publication/808761, viii.  
2 Ibid. 
3 “Dennis, M. Lormel, Chief, Financial Crimes Section, FBI before the House Committee on Financial 
Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,” Archives, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
February 12, 2002, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/financing-patterns-associated-with-al-
qaeda-and-global-terrorist-networks.  
4 Robert Block, “An L.A. Police Bust Shows New Tactics for Fighting Terror. Officers Use Local 
Laws to Arrest Small Offenders with High-Risk Potential,” Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2006, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116736247579862262; Rollie Lal, “Terrorists and Organized Crime Join 
Forces,” New York Times, May 24, 2005.  
5 Bryan Bender, “Stolen U.S. Vehicles End up as Bombs in Iraq, FBI Says,” New York Times, July 16, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/world/americas/16iht-16cars.6683928.html?pagewanted=all.  
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Although our federal, state, and local governments in the United States have 
developed effective laws and policies to reduce the number of motor vehicles stolen, 
these policies have largely failed to address the problem of the number of stolen vehicles 
that are exported each year. In 2015, there were an estimated 707,758 thefts of motor 
vehicles in the United States, causing more than $4.9 billion in loses, with an average loss 
of $7,001.00 per vehicle.6 At the Port of New York and New Jersey, in 2014, law 
enforcement recovered 312 stolen cars bound for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.7 
This was twice the number recovered in 2012 according to the Department of Homeland 
Security.8 
Because there has been a large decrease in the number of stolen vehicle for over 
25 years, very little research has focused on the problem and even less on associated 
crimes, such as illegal motor vehicle exports. With such limited research available, it is 
difficult to explain how these stolen exported vehicles factor into organized criminal 
activities. Fortunately, there are two researchers, Brown and Clarke, who have conducted 
extensive research on the stolen motor vehicle problem, especially the illicit export of 
stolen vehicles. Brown and Clarke divide their research on vehicle theft for export into 
three categories, which are helpful for understanding the issues at hand. First, they point 
out how authorities and all those concerned with the issue should understand the role and 
involvement of organized criminal elements in exporting stolen vehicles. Though there 
are similarities to more common vehicle thefts, the distinctions between them are 
important and make a substantial difference to impacting the threat. These distinctions 
are discussed in this research. Secondly, Brown and Clark note that real analysis about 
why certain countries become popular destinations for stolen vehicles for these organized 
criminal elements is essential. Finally, they discuss the need to improve the flawed 
practices among the shipping and freight forwarding businesses that allow stolen vehicles 
                                                 
6 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Motor Vehicle Theft, Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2015/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/motor-vehicle-theft/mvtheftmain_final.pdf.  
7 Ted Sherman, “Illicit Cargo: Why Are More Stolen Cars Disappearing Overseas?,” NJ, October 20, 
2014, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2014/10/illicit_cargo_why_are_more_stolen_cars_disappearing_ 
overseas.html.  
8 Ibid.  
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to evade current enforcement measures.9 Their research provides a baseline for 
understanding key aspects of the stolen vehicles for export problem. 
The issues raised here are gaps in the evidence-based research on the export of 
stolen vehicles. To date, there has been no definitive research examining effective 
methods for reducing the number of stolen vehicles being exported from major U.S. 
ports. There are a number of contributing factors why this kind of research is limited. For 
instance, stolen vehicles are typically investigated at the local law enforcement level, 
while exports, which involve foreign and domestic businesses, are primarily the 
responsibility of federal agencies.10 The aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks on the United 
States prompted the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) to re-examine and 
establish antiterrorism programs, including programs regarding imports, to protect the 
United States. Within several months, the USCBP established the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), an effort to protect the homeland from potential maritime shipping 
container terror threats.11 However, the CSI program established protocols to address 
maritime security threats of U.S. imports, not exports.12 Despite my own intimate 
engagement with these issues and significant time studying the relevant literature, my 
research has uncovered no similar container program for exports. This disconnect is 
problematic at best and potentially inhibits effective homeland security. The difficulty in 
local/state/federal interaction and communication, especially regarding the need to 
restructure, has been well documented in the post 9/11 world and a similar disconnect is a 
concern for stakeholders attempting to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations 
exporting stolen vehicles from our ports.13  
                                                 
9 Rick Brown and Ronald V. Clarke, Police Intelligence and Theft of Vehicles for Export: Recent U.K. 
Experience, Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 17 (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University, 2004), 173–192.  
10 “About Commerce,” U.S. Department of Commerce, accessed December 16, 2017, 
https://www.commerce.gov/page/about-commerce. 
11 “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, last updated June 26, 
2014, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief.  
12 Ibid.  
13 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], Final Report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company Inc. 2004), 305.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research examines the problem of stolen vehicles exported for illicit 
purposes and how the New York Police Department (NYPD) uses specific enforcement 
strategies to deter and disrupt these criminal activities. Additionally, this thesis seeks to 
address the following research questions:  
• How do targeted, strategic police operations reduce the number of stolen 
vehicles from areas located near the Port areas of New York and New 
Jersey? 
• Do these policy insights from the New York and New Jersey case study 
point to more general policy changes that will make it more difficult for 
criminal enterprises to export stolen vehicles? 
• Is it possible to demonstrate how a connection between organized crime 
and the use of exported stolen vehicles can aid terrorism activities? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Stolen exported vehicles near land borders and seaports have been cited as a 
significant growing problem in both media reports and academic studies. However, little 
is documented in literature about its scale, how this relates to or benefits the international 
recipients, and what conditions facilitate this illicit activity.14 In 2015, there were an 
estimated 707,758 thefts of motor vehicles, causing more than $4.9 billion in losses and 
an average loss of $7,001.00 per vehicle.15 Furthermore, it has been documented that 
vehicle theft is the second most profitable crime in the United States, surpassed only by 
illegal narcotics trafficking.16  
This type of criminal activity has both domestic and international implications, 
which suggests that current intelligence strategies may be inadequate for understanding 
how information on exported stolen vehicles is collected and used to positively impact 
                                                 
14 Steven Block, An Analysis of Internationally Exported Vehicle Thefts in Two High-Risk Cities 
(Newark, NJ: Rutgers University, 2012), ii.  
15 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Motor Vehicle Theft.  
16 Paul D. McClellan, “Vehicle Theft Investigation Is about-Looking beyond the Traffic Stop,” Police 
Chief. Police Chief Magazine 72, no 11 (November, 2005), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/vehicle-
theft-investigation-is-about-looking-beyond-the-traffic-stop/.  
5 
our homeland security enterprise.17 Because stolen vehicle trafficking is generally 
nonviolent and considered more of an economic crime, local governments and police 
departments tend to address other crimes such as robberies and homicides as a higher 
priority.18 This author gathered, documented, and analyzed available information from 
the local level, such as police incident reports, vehicle insurance reports, and stolen 
vehicle recoveries from the Port of New York and New Jersey; the analysis section of 
this thesis discusses these findings. Additionally, the author has examined the 
implementation of Real ID and its relevance to secure title documentation for vehicle 
owners.  
1. Port of New York and New Jersey
This thesis focuses on stolen vehicles exported from New York and New Jersey 
seaports for three reasons. First, the Port of New York and New Jersey is the largest 
seaport on the East Coast, and it has a favorable reputation among criminal groups as a 
vulnerable shipping port.19 This inadvertently enables criminal enterprise groups to 
illicitly transfer of stolen vehicles under the premise of legitimate cargo for export, due to 
the sheer volume of exports and the lack of inspection capacity.20 Secondly, the Port of 
New York and New Jersey offers direct, maritime pathways to West African countries, 
avoiding the possibility of transshipment stops, which may allow law enforcement 
authorities additional time to identify containers with stolen vehicles.21 Third, stolen 
vehicles destined for West African countries are often acquired through violent means, 
such as carjackings.22 Additionally, as West African countries develop and integrate into 
17 Ronald V. Clarke and Michael, G. Maxfield, Understanding and Preventing Car Theft, Crime 
Prevention Studies, Vol. 17 (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), 175.  
18 Clarke and Brown, “International Trafficking in Stolen Vehicles,” 199. 
19 Matthew Chambers, Atlantic Coast U.S. Seaports (FS-002) (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2010), https://www.rita.dot.gov/ 
bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/bts_fact_sheets/october_2010/pdf/entire.pdf; Leonid Lantsman, 
“‘Movable Currency’: The Role of Seaports in Export Oriented Vehicle Theft,” Crime, Law, and Social 
Change 59, no. 2 (2013): 170.  
20 Chambers, Atlantic Coast U.S. Seaports; Lantsman, “‘Movable Currency,’” 170. 
21 Lantsman, “‘Movable Currency,’” 173. 
22 Ibid., 175. 
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the global economy, and their middle class sectors strive to develop, their demand for 
quality vehicles at low costs rises.23  
The Port of New York and New Jersey is the largest port on the East Coast, but it 
is not the sole export location for shipping out stolen vehicles. Criminals also use other 
locations on the East Coast, such as Miami, Savannah, and Baltimore, as export locations. 
Southern land border ports with proximity to the border of Mexico are not relevant in this 
thesis research; however, auto theft across land borders is both concerning and studied.24 
Brown and Clark’s studies on the auto theft exports are foundational in the literature and 
are documented in Police Intelligence and Theft of Vehicles for Export, a United 
Kingdom Experience.25 The United Kingdom’s experience offers some lessons 
concerning the stolen vehicle export problem for other countries and also offers some 
insights into the connection between organized crime and terrorism. In the 1980’s and 
1990’s, the typical fate of a stolen vehicle was a quick trip to a chop shop or joy ride.26 
Today, sophisticated organized crime rings are involved in a lucrative, vehicle export 
scheme where demand for high-end luxury vehicles in foreign countries such as those in 
West Africa is on the rise. In addition, there is some concern that these exported stolen 
vehicles are being used to fund organized crime and terrorism. A stolen vehicle exported 
from the United States may pass through several countries and hands before reaching its 
intended destination, leaving no traceable trail. Further research is essential to document 
the importance of tracking distribution nodes for exported stolen vehicles.  
In their groundbreaking research, Brown and Clarke asked questions about how 
organized crime has changed, and they conclude that large, strictly hierarchical 
organizations have evolved into smaller pockets of criminal entrepreneurs who have 
                                                 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ronald V. Clarke, and Gohar Petrossian, Export of Stolen Vehicles across Land Borders, Problem-
Specific Guides Series, no. 63 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2012), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p213-pub.pdf.  
25 Brown and Clarke, Police Intelligence, 173–192.  
26 Katherine Adger, “An Analysis of Location and Offender Characteristics for Motor Vehicle Theft in 
Texas from 2001 to 2005” (master’s thesis, University of North Texas, 2007), 11.  
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become better at avoiding detection.27 Organized criminal activity typically involves 
loose networks of contacts, which is more difficult to uncover and analyze because of the 
multiple organizations and individuals involved.28 This lack of intelligence about the role 
of organized crime in facilitating the export of stolen vehicles is one of the key problems 
in developing a comprehensive understanding of the problem.29  
The United States is not immune to stolen vehicles for export. In 2003, Interpol 
estimated that the international trafficking of stolen vehicles was producing 19 billion 
U.S. dollars in economic losses annually.30 Interpol has identified vehicle crime as  
highly organized criminal activity affecting all regions of the whole world 
and with clear links to organized crime and terrorism. Vehicles are not 
only stolen for their own sake, but are also trafficked to finance other 
crimes. They can also be used as bomb carriers or in the perpetration of 
other crimes.31  
In an effort to address stolen vehicle theft abroad, Interpol has also created the Stolen 
Motor Vehicle database (SMV), available to participating countries, in an effort to 
combat international vehicle theft and trafficking.32 The SMV database allows police in 
member countries the ability to query vehicles and determine if they are stolen; this 
critical search criteria is available across European borders.33 In 2015, authorities 
identified approximately 123,000 vehicles as stolen with the help from the SMV 
database.34  
Published information about stolen vehicles used to specifically support terrorism 
is scarce. One reason for this could be because much of this information is collected by 
                                                 
27 Brown and Clarke, Police Intelligence, 173–192.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 “Vehicle Crime, Interpol, Lyon, France,” Interpol, accessed November 5, 2017, 
http://www.interpol.int/public/vehicle/default.asp.  
31 “Vehicle Crime,” Interpol, accessed November 5, 2017, https://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Vehicle-crime/Vehicle-crime.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
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federal government agencies and is classified information. Bill Warner is a private 
investigator in Florida, and he has documented his concerns about the use of stolen 
vehicles to finance terror networks and as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices 
(VBIEDs). In an article Warner published on Word Press, he states,  
Trafficking and smuggling of stolen vehicles are mainly the work of 
structured and sophisticated global criminal groups. Such huge profits can 
be used by criminal organizations to strengthen their activities and support 
terrorism, while destabilizing developing nations at the same time.35 
Commercial vehicles and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) are inviting and deceitful 
vehicles for terrorists as these vehicles can transport heavy loads of explosive materials 
and pass through security checkpoints undisturbed.36 In many cases, terrorists reinforce 
the suspensions on these commercial vehicles and SUVs to carry a heavier load of 
explosives to the target location. This is done so the vehicle does not appear to be low to 
the ground, thus alerting law enforcement or military personnel to the awkwardly 
overloaded vehicle.37  
In May 1999, the U.S. Customs Service prepared a report to the Honorable Susan 
M. Collins, Chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate on Efforts to Curtail the Exportation of Stolen 
Vehicles.38 Although this report was produced in 1999, the same concerns of stolen 
vehicles exported illegally from the United States hold true today. The report is a 
response to a request by the chair to describe efforts by the then U.S. Customs Service to 
“curtail the exportation of stolen vehicles from the United States.”39 Investigators 
                                                 
35 Bill Warner, “Confessions of a Federal Confidential Informant. Stolen Cars From Tampa to Dubai 
in Support of Terrorism,” PI Bill Warner, June 16, 2009, 
https://pibillwarner.wordpress.com/2009/06/16/confessions-of-a-federal-confidential-informant-stolen-
cars-from-tampa-to-dubai-in-support-of-terrorism.  
36 Carlton Purvis, “Confession Details How Boko Haram Uses Stolen Cars to Support Terrorism 
Operations,” Security Management, February 23, 2012, https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/confession-details-
how-boko-haram-uses-stolen-cars-support-terrorism-operations-009580.aspx.  
37 “Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs),” Global Security, accessed October 15, 2017, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-vehicle.htm.  
38 U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Customs Service: Efforts to Curtail the Exportation 
(GAO/OSI-99-10) (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999).  
39 Ibid.  
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conducted on-site visits at port operations in Florida, Texas, and California to observe the 
shipping processes associated with vehicle exportation and briefed the government office 
on their findings. The report identifies four items of focus: 
1. Applicable regulations for exporting used, self-propelled vehicles from the 
United States. 
2. Customs policies and procedures for controlling the export of these 
vehicles. 
3. Methods used to illegally export those vehicles. 
4. Improvements in operations being considered by Customs .40 
Even though they were written for the U.S. Customs Service, which is no longer 
in operation, these items of focus are important to this thesis because they are part of the 
legitimate vehicle export process and the stolen vehicles for export market. For instance, 
item one specifies the applicable regulations for exporting vehicles from the United 
States. In many cases, criminals ignore these regulations and this results in improperly 
manifested cargo, allowing stolen vehicles to be exported undetected.41  
In an effort to curtail stolen vehicles for export and send a message to criminal 
networks on the receiving end, the United States, through its official diplomatic channels, 
has negotiated a number of treaties with relevant countries, which help the actual owners 
of these vehicles deal more effectively with the tangled morass created by cross border 
illegal exportation of their property.42 Vehicle owners often face the frustrating task of 
working with police departments and insurance agencies in an attempt to recover their 
stolen vehicle, which may end up overseas, in cases of domestic theft. The implemented 
treaties and assistance from the U.S. State Department provide a glimmer of hope as 
these may assist the vehicle owners in recovering their vehicles from a foreign country. 
The USCBP 1999 report includes a list of existing and proposed treaties.43 On paper, 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 1.  
41 Lantsman, “‘Movable Currency,’” 170.  
42 Sally J. Cummings and David P. Stewart, eds., Digest of United States Practice in International 
Law (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, 2002), 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/139638.pdf, 65.  
43 Block, An Analysis of Internationally Exported Vehicle Thefts, 24.  
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these agreements sound like an effective approach, but in reality, the stated actions are 
difficult to achieve; this is especially true when dealing with countries with corrupt 
government officials. Researchers have estimated that only one percent of stolen exported 
vehicles from the United States are returned.44 A review of U.S. State Department’s 
stolen vehicle bilateral treaties identified agreements with Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Panama and Mexico. Currently, there are no similar treaties 
between any of the West African countries and the United States.45 
2. REAL ID Act and REAL ID for Vehicles 
Responding to recommendations by the 9/11 Commission, Congress enacted the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The act allowed federal 
authorities to set and regulate the minimum standards for state issued drivers licenses and 
other state issued personal identification cards—regardless of state specific differences.46 
Beyond setting these minimum standards, the 2004 act also laid out an important 
requirement for the various stakeholders concerned with authenticating personal 
identification to join together to discuss and develop uniform standards.47  
It is not unusual for the federal government to provide oversight when prompted. 
For example, the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, an effort to prevent carjackings, brought 
federal oversight and mandates to impose tougher laws and penalties for auto theft, and 
the act contains specific sections to address carjackings, importation (interstate 
trafficking) and exportation, trafficking in stolen vehicles and automobile title fraud.48 
However, unlike Real ID, the Anti Car Theft Act did not mandate states to create a secure 
motor vehicle title with uniform, federal standards including security features.  
                                                 
44 Adger, “An Analysis of Location,” 11.  
45 Cummings and Stewart, Digest of United States, 65.  
46 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, supra note 1 at 
7212 (2004).  
47 Ibid. 
48 Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519 (1992).  
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Questions and debate continue in relation to secure identification even after 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 became law.49 State issued 
vehicle drivers license have become one of the most important and common forms of 
accepted identification. Because of the ubiquitous manner in which state issued drivers 
license are used, Congress recognized national minimum standards were needed to 
protect the homeland regardless of state specific differences.50 The Real ID Act of 2005 
further codified what was and what is not recognized as valid ID.51 While there have 
been challenges to overcome in the design and implementation of these standards, the 
result has been increased security with greater confidence in the accuracy of 
information.52 Since delegated power was given to the secretary of transportation to 
evaluate and later make recommendations for a secure drivers license, perhaps further 
similar research would be beneficial to study policy and export concerns of stolen motor 
vehicles and vehicle title document fraud.  
The September 11 hijackers collectively had 30 state-issued driver’s licenses and 
non-driver identification cards, some of which were legitimate and others which were 
obtained fraudulently.53 These identifications were used to board planes but also used by 
terrorists to navigate freely in society virtually undetected.54 The law set forth certain 
requirements for identification cards and drivers licenses to be accepted by the federal 
government for “official purposes.” With new laws set and a definition in place, the 
government’s objective is to make it more difficult for people to obtain multiple 
identifications. Similarly, this objective would be beneficial with regard to vehicle title 
                                                 
49 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  




53 Janice Kephart, “Real ID Implementation Annual Report: Major Progress Made in Securing 
Driver’s License Issuance against Identity Theft and Fraud,” Backgrounder (February 2012), 
https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2012/real-id-2012.pdf; “Threats and Responses: Document Fraud; 
Guilty Plea Expected by Seller of Fake IDs to 9/11 Hijackers,” New York Times, February 4, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/04/nyregion/threats-responses-document-fraud-guilty-plea-expected-
seller-fake-id-s-9-11.html.  
54 “Real ID Implementation Annual Report: Major Progress Made in Securing Driver’s License 
Issuance against Identity Theft and Fraud,” Backgrounder (February 2012).  
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fraud. The Department of Homeland Security has defined these official purposes “…as 
presenting state driver’s licenses and identification cards for boarding commercially 
operated airline flights and entering federal buildings and nuclear power plants.”55  
This is of critical importance to citizens because if a state is noncompliant with 
issuing the new identification requirement, it could be extremely difficult for its citizens 
to gain access to commercial airports and federal buildings. Therefore, it is compelling to 
have identification documents recognized and authorized by federal agencies for all 
official purposes. So, in building from the Real ID template for secure identification, 
perhaps we should study this template further as to how it may pertain to secure vehicle 
titles. In their writings, Brown, Adger, and Block have documented how vehicle 
document fraud contributes to the stolen vehicle for export problem.56  
With the current advances in printer technology since 1992, specifically the 
ability to recreate and forge documents (such as drivers licenses, birth certificates and 
vehicle titles) and due to vehicle document fraud, it would be worth the investment for 
stakeholders to re-examine and update the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992. A modest 
investment in research could prove fruitful in the potential development of future policy 
in this field. 
3. National Motor Vehicle Title Information System  
The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 required the Department of Transportation to 
establish a system for states to track and share vehicle title information.57 In 1996, as a 
result of the Anti Car Theft Improvements Act, the Department of Justice established 
control of the title information system and renamed it the National Motor Vehicle Title 
Information System (NMVTIS).58 Currently, 39 states are participating in the system; six 
                                                 
55 “Real ID,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  
56 Adger, “An Analysis of Location,” 21; Rick Brown and Ronald V. Clarke, “International 
Trafficking in Stolen Vehicles,” Crime and Justice 30 (2003): 197–227, https://doi.org/10.1086/652231.  
57 “National Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS); Final Rule,” Federal Register 74, 
no. 19 (2009): 5740, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-30/pdf/E9-1835.pdf.  
58 “For Consumers,” National Motor Vehicle Titling Information System, accessed November 5, 2017, 
https://www.vehiclehistory.gov/nmvtis_consumers.html.  
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states provide data only and six states are under development.59 The system is designed 
to allow titling agencies to instantly verify the information on a paper title with that of 
what is electronically stored from the state issued title.60 It is designed to keep stolen 
vehicles from being resold for illicit purposes, including funding criminal enterprises, and 
to protect consumers from fraud and unsafe vehicles. It also assists law enforcement and 
states in deterring and preventing vehicle title fraud.61 NMVTIS stores current and 
historical information about vehicles, which auto recyclers, junkyards, and salvage yards 
have owned, maintained or otherwise possessed.62 This information is used by states and 
consumers to ensure that these vehicles are not resold to unsuspecting consumers and to 
keep their vehicle identification numbers (VIN) from being transferred to stolen 
vehicles.63 Often times, criminal groups present junked or salvage titles to USCBP with a 
stolen vehicle for export because the title is authentic, meanwhile the stolen vehicle has 
been placed inside the shipping container, which usually goes unchecked.64  
It is not mandatory for junkyards to submit junked titles to the state and or 
NMVTIS, which creates a reporting requirement problem. If it worked properly, 
according to a 2007 New York Times article,  
the system has the potential to track every car or truck in the country by its 
VIN but the system has languished over the years because of local 
government inattention, a lack of urgency among state motor vehicle 
departments, and inconsistent federal funding.65  
The Department of Justice is ultimately responsible for recommending and implementing 
national motor vehicle policy standards. In addition, safeguards, such as NMVTIS, do 
assist stakeholders, including USCBP, in the illegal trade of stolen vehicles.  
                                                 
59 “For States,” National Motor Vehicle Titling Information System, accessed October 15, 2017, 
https://www.vehiclehistory.gov/nmvtis_states.html.  
60 “National Motor Vehicle Title Information System,” American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators, accessed October 15, 2016, https://www.aamva.org/nmvtis.  
61 Ibid.  
62 “For Consumers,” National Motor Vehicle Titling Information System.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Lantsman, ‘“Moveable Currency”’ 170.  
65 Bender, “Stolen U.S. Vehicles End up.”  
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4. Stolen Vehicles and Terrorism 
American vehicles are among the favorite vehicles insurgents use as VBIEDs in 
Iraq. First, the steering wheel is on the correct side of the vehicle for the intended West 
African countries to which the vehicles are being exported. Second, a large SUV can 
blend in easier as an American security vehicle allowing the vehicle to get closer to its 
target.66 The FBI does not report publicly how many stolen U.S. vehicles have been used 
as VBIEDs in terrorist activities, but it is believed to be in the dozens.67 “A car bomb is 
the absolute favorite delivery methods of terrorists,” said Special Agent Ryan Toole of 
the FBI’s Major Theft Unit in Washington, DC. “Tracing that VIN [vehicle identification 
number] is very, very, important” for investigators to properly identify where the vehicle 
originated from and determine how the vehicles wind up with terrorists.68 Toole asserts 
that forensic specialists, “…have identified some bomb-rigged cars as vehicles that were 
swiped off American streets and sold overseas by criminal gangs and organized 
syndicates.”69 Getting the VIN number from a car used in an attack is a very difficult task 
and is often not a priority of the military.  
In November 2005, an incident in Fallujah, Iraq occurred when coalition troops 
raided a bomb-making factory and found an SUV with Texas registration, which was 
being prepared for use by terrorists in a bombing mission.70 Some of these vehicles can 
be identified easily while others have had their VIN numbers ground down. In many 
cases involving car theft, local car thieves may not know, nor care, where the stolen 
vehicle will end up, as the domestic steal crews are simply taking advantage of the 
demand for stolen vehicles; however, in this incident, investigators believe these stolen 
vehicles were taken from U.S. cities and exported from shipping ports as diverse as Los 
                                                 
66 “Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs),” Global Security.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Bryan Bender, “US Car Theft Rings Probed for Ties to Iraq Bombings,” The Boston Globe, October 
2, 2005, http://archive.boston.com/news/world/articles/2005/10/02/us_car_theft_rings_probed_for_ties_ 
to_iraq_bombings/.  
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Angeles, Seattle, and Houston.71 From shipping ports across the United States, vehicles 
are moved to global criminal nodes.72 The vehicles are then sold for profit or supplied to 
foreign fighters, who can maneuver openly, transitioning across borders in the regions 
where they have critical logistical support to support their criminal activities.73 
Investigators have found that U.S.-based car theft rings ship stolen cars to Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where they are sold for profit or even 
transported to countries to be used as car bombs in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan.74 
An official who leads the Investigative Project on Terrorism, a research firm out of 
Washington, DC, states that the auto theft market is an unregulated market, and some of 
the proceeds are supporting terrorism.75 Officials in Canada have also made similar 
statements concerning stolen vehicles used to fund terror activities. The Insurance Bureau 
of Canada has warned, “high-end cars and SUVs stolen in Canada could be financing 
global terrorism.”76  
5. Trade and Security 
Loose border controls facilitate the efforts of international criminals to expand 
their criminal enterprise(s) and avoid arrest.77 The U.S. Department of State identifies the 
international crime threat to the United States as having an impact on our society across 
three broad, global fronts. First, it has an impact on our communities, financial 
institutions, and American businesses. Secondly, it threatens global security and stability, 
and third, the exportation of stolen vehicles are part of this threat.78 By implementing 
                                                 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Bill Warner, “Follow the Money and the Stolen Cars: Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism on the Cheap,” 
Shariah Finance Watch (blog), August 24, 2008, http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/2008/08/24/ 
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75 Ibid.  
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77 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2002 Budget 
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stiff border controls on the export level, the return on investment can create a substantial 
deterrent to global criminal enterprise networks and have an impact as a first line of 
defense for not only the United States but also destination countries.79 
The post-9/11 debate on trade versus security emphasizes trade imports into the 
United States; in contrast, export security has not been a national priority. If we are so 
focused on imports, are we doing our due diligence and connecting the dots concerning 
exports?80 This critical analysis of the existent literature suggests we are not doing 
enough concerning exports. The events of 9/11 caused the U.S. government to establish 
new trade protocols and evaluate how it monitors the movement of cargo and its contents 
within the United States and abroad.81 According to Peterson and Treat, 
These protocols have been incorporated into international frameworks 
such as those under the World Customs Organization (WCO), and in 
country-specific programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) 
administered by the United States.82  
Post 9/11 security concerns regarding cargo has not only effected the United States but 
has had a similar impact on U.S. trading partners. Some of our partners have employed 
new security protocols, while others have worked to enhance their existing cargo 
programs.83 Trading partners in Canada, Australia, Sweden, and New Zealand have 
benefited from the United States strengthening its cargo standards, and they have aimed 
to mirror their own standards with those same standards enacted by the United States.84  
The Container Security Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism are two programs created by the United States that have had an impact on 
cargo security on a global scale. These two programs have been incorporated into the 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 5. 
80. “CSI: Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Joann Peterson and Alan Treat, “The Post-9/11 Global Framework for Cargo Security,” Journal of 
International Commerce and Economics 2 (March 2008): 1–20, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/ 
332/journals/cargo_security.pdf.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid.  
 17 
international frameworks of the World Customs Organization.85 Currently, USCBP 
require goods imported into the United States to be pre-screened at ports of departure and 
for manifests to be provided ahead of time, unlike the pre-9/11 requirement of inspecting 
goods and manifests upon arrival to the United States. These two programs continue to 
enable USCBP to physically inspect cargo upon its arrival; however, computer 
automation and detection technology have streamlined the importation process.86 
Although post 9/11 cargo security programs have progressed, businesses participating in 
the programs have raised questions about the programs effectiveness and burdening costs, 
which negative impact their finances.87   
Post-9/11 cargo security programs attempt a holistic approach to securing the 
global supply chain by integrating cooperative measures between public and private 
partners.88 By prioritizing important “behind-the-border measures” in protecting the 
global cargo supply chain, stakeholders are more effective in achieving their security 
goals.89 Private businesses, working with trade facilitators such as the World Trade 
Organization, can find comparable solutions to address trade facilitation and a secure 
trading environment, recognizing that working together, rather than working 
independently of one another, can be beneficial to all parties.90 However, cargo exported 
from the United States does not come under the same scrutiny as the imported cargo. As 
Clarke and Brown explain, with regard to the trade of vehicles, there is a substantial legal 
trade between the United States and foreign countries in the sale and purchase of used 
vehicles, where demand is placed on developed countries to supply underdeveloped 
countries.91 In 2016, the Port of New York and New Jersey processed approximately 
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3,602,508 shipping containers.92 For the same year, approximately 206,811 ro-ro93 
vehicles were physically driven onto a ship for export.94 Approximately 30,000 to 40,000 
vehicles are shipped out of the port per month.95 With such large volumes of vehicles 
being exported from U.S. ports and USCBP only inspecting approximately one percent of 
exports, criminal networks involved in the trafficking of stolen vehicles hide behind this 
technique, concealing their activities as authentic and legal cargo.96 Essentially, the 
floodgates continue to widen for auto theft exports as globalization, and demand for 
cheap vehicles, continues to grow. If stakeholders scrutinized vehicles for export with the 
same attention as given to imports, the possibilities of reducing the number of exported 
stolen vehicles could be significant.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This study draws on data from public news releases and articles of case 
takedowns/arrests and indictments of individuals and groups arrested for the purpose of 
procuring stolen vehicles for export at New York and New Jersey seaports. The data 
includes press releases, media announcements, and case investigations conducted by law 
enforcement members in the NYPD, New Jersey State Police, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations and USCBP. In addition, the data 
set focuses on stolen vehicle cases at the seaports of New York and New Jersey over the 
past seven years and highlights the difficulties other authors, such as Block and 
Lantsman, have pointed out in identifying the need for further research on this subject 
matter.97  
In addition to the data set, this thesis critically examines if a national motor 
vehicle title would be beneficial to assist stakeholders in combating stolen vehicles for 
                                                 
92 “2016 Trade Statistics,” Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, April 2017, 
www.panynj.gov/port/pdf/2005-2016-Historical-Trade-Stats-summary.pdf. 
93 A ro-ro is a vehicle that is rolled on and rolled off a ship, not placed inside a shipping container.  
94 “2016 Trade Statistics,” Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  
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export. It also includes other forms of vehicle fraud, such as vehicle title washing and 
vehicle title fraud.98 This thesis examines the post-9/11 implementation of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, specifically the Real ID Act, 
to identify the challenges associated with implementing those policy changes for the 
purpose of recommending if a national motor vehicle title would be a realistic option to 
address the export of stolen vehicles. The remaining chapters of this thesis examine those 
possibilities and suggest where new or improved policies might be effective.  
  
                                                 
98 Title washing is a scheme in which fraudulent titles or titles branded “salvage” are swapped in other 
states who in turn provide an authentic title, making the title/vehicle appear legitimate.  
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II. THE NYPD BEST UNIT: A CASE STUDY 
This chapter is a case study of NYPD’s efforts to reduce the export of stolen 
motor vehicles. This case study demonstrates the value of coordinated efforts among law 
enforcement agencies at the local, state and federal level to combat the illegal exportation 
of stolen vehicles at seaports. It also examines the success of methodical approaches 
aimed at disrupting criminal enterprise networks here in the United States and 
internationally from illegally exporting stolen vehicles.  
The NYPD is divided into major bureaus for enforcement, investigations, and 
administration. The patrol force consists of 77 patrol precincts with officers and 
detectives responsible to cover the entire city. The departments 12 transit districts are 
responsible for patrolling the city’s subway system and its nearly six million daily 
passengers. The police service area is responsible for patrolling the city’s public housing 
developments, which house more than 400,000 residents. Patrol, transit, and housing are 
known as the backbone of the department and are supported by a wide variety of other 
bureaus, including but not limited to investigative and administrative bureaus. 
For the purposes of this case study, the research focuses on the NYPD’s 
investigative bureaus, which include the Detective Bureau, Intelligence Bureau, 
Counterterrorism Bureau, Crime Control Strategies, and Internal Affairs Bureau. 
Specifically, we examine NYPD’s Auto-Crime Unit, which is aligned under the 
Detective Bureau-Criminal Enterprise Division. As explained by the NYPD’s public web 
page, the  
Auto-Crime unit identifies, investigates, and arrests individuals or groups 
responsible for the organized or repeated theft of vehicles. In an effort to 
reduce auto theft in New York City, the division conducts long-term 
investigations and performs extensive analyses of citywide patterns and 
trends. Detectives investigate fraudulent complaints of vehicle thefts and 
monitor operations of second-hand auto and auto parts dealers, junk-yards, 
dismantlers, re-builders, and scrap processors. They are also called upon 
to assist other NYPD commands in examining and identifying stolen 
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vehicles and forged vehicle documents, as well as recovery of stolen 
vehicles and parts.99 
A. THE NYPD STRATEGY 
In April 2011, the commanding officer of the NYPD Auto-Crime Unit 
recommended to the police commissioner that the NYPD imbed investigators into the 
Border Enforcement Security Task Force, a newly formed task force that reports to the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations, New York 
office. The commissioner took the recommendation. The focus of BEST is auto theft 
exports at nearby area seaports as well as other criminal activities impacting border 
security such as the importation of narcotics and counterfeit goods via maritime 
pathways.  
Geographic, jurisdictional boundaries can often constrain law enforcement 
investigations; however, criminals and criminal enterprises easily cross these boundaries. 
The benefits of embedding local detectives within federal task forces is the cross 
designation of the local detective/investigator to investigate and assist with the 
prosecution of federal statutes, leveraging expertise and resources. Funding, information 
sharing, and interagency cooperation are all part of the benefits of working and sharing 
work responsibilities with partner agencies. In June 2011, the police commissioner 
assigned one sergeant and six investigators to NY BEST. In total, the task force consists 
of over 18 highly skilled investigators across multiple federal and local agencies. This 
allows participating NYPD auto crime investigators direct access to federal databases, 
daily interaction with U.S. customs inspectors, and direct access to the seaports where 
containers were being exported. NYPD personnel assigned to this task force fall under 
the NYPD’s Detective Bureau, Criminal Enterprise Division. In discharging their BEST 
responsibilities, NYPD personnel have deployed strategies focusing on domestic vehicle 
thefts and collaborative strategies that focus on international vehicle thefts.  
                                                 
99 “About the NYPD,” New York City Police Department, accessed October 15, 2017, 
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page.  
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B. DOMESTIC-BASED BUT INTERNATIONALLY FOCUSED 
STRATEGIES 
NYPD has incorporated a number of strategies targeting international targets 
operating in concert with U.S.-based operatives engaged in the illegal exportation of 
stolen vehicles.100 Internal, confidential NYPD documents detail targeted strategies, such 
as identifying persons with improper possession and distribution of motor vehicle titles 
for the purposes of illegal exports and working with rental car companies in an attempt to 
stop the flow of rental vehicles for export. Other strategies, such as using automatic 
license plate readers at bridges, have become effective in tracking the movement of stolen 
vehicles and identifying follow-on vehicles used to trail the stolen vehicle.101 For 
example, these readers were useful in solving an auto theft problem in Staten Island, New 
York wherein criminals drove stolen vehicles across state lines into New Jersey to 
layover locations before being transported to final foreign destinations.102 
1. Collaborative Enforcement Strategies 
Because stolen vehicles cross state lines as well as international boundaries, 
NYPD has become a leader in collaboration with federal enforcement agencies and 
federal prosecutors to address cross-jurisdictional criminal activities. For example, in 
conducting Operation Steals for Senegal, NYPD identified a connection between a local 
auto theft investigation and an international car theft operation shipping stolen vehicles to 
West Africa.103  
                                                 
100 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, “Defendant Sentenced to 5 Years’ 
Imprisonment for Exporting Stolen Luxury Cars Worth over $1 Million to Africa,” press release, 
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2. NYPD BEST: A Learning Organization 
The success of a single enforcement effort often drives the criminal element to 
develop new markets for stealing and exporting motor vehicles. Operation Steals for 
Senegal was successful, and through it, NYPD learned strategies that it could use to 
negate other auto theft networks. For instance, investigators learned that by seeking 
permission to go outside their geographic boundaries and outsourcing leads to their 
federal counterparts, they could effectively address the larger criminal enterprise 
structure. This information led to the deployment of other strategies in a case named 
Operation Steals for Rent, which used successful investigative techniques to combat 
high-end vehicles being rented from various car rental companies and then exported. 
These include the mobile deployment of license plate readers at critical bridge crossings 
to track cross-state vehicle movements and information sharing with USCBP. Using these 
techniques allowed investigators to target a key individual who masterminded a 
multistate auto theft criminal syndicate that exported high-end luxury SUVs to Ghana, 
West Africa. This particular individual utilized diaspora networks to facilitate the 
exportation of high-end luxury SUVs to her hometown in Ghana.  
3. Comparison Data on Stolen Vehicles 
The author analyzed and reviewed stolen vehicle seizures from 2007 through 
2017 at the Port of New York and New Jersey, Savannah, Georgia, and, Jacksonville, 
Florida. All of these ports ship containers to West African countries. Table 1 outlines the 
number of stolen vehicles recovered from each seaport since 2010.104   
                                                 
104 Data pulled by author from U.S. Department of Homeland Security Automated Export System 
database, November 12, 2017.  
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Table 1.   Vehicle Seizures at Area East Coast Ports, 2007 to 2017105 
Year Port of NY/NJ Port of Savannah, GA 
Port of 
Jacksonville, FL 
2017 146 2 2 
2016 151 7 2 
2015 234 17 10 
2014 333 14 8 
2013 229 40 9 
2012 124 30 17 
2011 243 73 8 
2010 148 8 7 
2009 72 14 8 
2008 19 5 17 
2007 3 6 40 
 
The Port of New York and New Jersey is the second largest port in the country 
after the port of Los Angeles. Vehicle export numbers are typically greater than those of 
smaller ports due to the large volume of cargo being imported and exported. For this case 
study, the author chose East Coast ports due to ships departing from these locations to 
West African countries.106  
The New York/New Jersey seizure numbers from 2010 forward are important 
because the NYPD began investigating vehicle thefts for export in 2010 when NYPD 
assigned two detectives on temporary status to NY BEST. From Table 1, one 
immediately notices that NY BEST has had a significant impact on increasing the 
                                                 
105 Adapted from: Author’s search of U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Automated Export 
System database, November 12, 2017.  
106 Lantsman, “‘Movable Currency,’” 158.  
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number of vehicles recovered in port.107 However, the numbers fluctuate over the years. 
Some of these fluctuations can be explained by the propensity of illegal exporters to “port 
shop,” and some fluctuations are due to strategic auto theft enforcement targeting 
organized theft rings in the surrounding areas.108 The term “port shop” refers to a process 
whereby illegal exporters take notice of enhanced law enforcement activities and move 
their illegal exports to different ports to avoid detection. 
As noted, NYPD has demonstrated considerable success in reducing the number 
of stolen vehicles exported each year. Although the overall number of vehicles recovered 
in port is small compared to the overall number of vehicles reported stolen, the impact on 
their use in financing terrorism might be considerable. We know that a number of these 
vehicles are bound for West Africa. We also know that a significant number of these 
vehicles are high dollar luxury SUVs.109 While we do not know who all the intended 
recipients are for these stolen vehicles, nor how they intend to use them, we do know that 
it cost less than a half million dollars to finance the 9/11 terrorist attacks.110 It would take 
only a small portion of these stolen vehicles to raise substantial funding for a criminal or 
terrorist organization. Intelligence authorities spend much of their time collecting and 
analyzing data, or what others have called “connecting the dots,” and this may be one 
area not receiving adequate attention from law enforcement and the intelligence 
community.111  
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C. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
The following examples illustrate some creative methods that the NYPD has 
employed to address both domestic and international issues associated with vehicular 
theft. These are examples of actual NYPD operations: Operations Steals for Senegal, 
Operation Auto Intercept, Operation Summer Rental, and Operation Jacked.  
1. Operation Steals for Senegal 
Combatting auto theft is an ongoing challenge for law enforcement and insurance 
companies. To that end, law enforcement organizations often set up operations to target a 
specific group or problem. For example, in 2010, the NYPD Auto-Crime Division 
conducted a transcontinental export investigation named Operation Steals for Senegal. 
This operation targeted a group of West African auto exporters and domestic theft crews 
suspected of shipping stolen high-end vehicles out of the Port of New York and New 
Jersey.112 As auto-crime investigators pursued their investigation, it led them to USCBP 
vehicle title desk at the Port of New York and New Jersey. Investigators discovered that 
criminals placed the stolen vehicles inside shipping containers, trucked them to the 
seaport, and exported them to several West African countries.113 These criminals were 
exploiting the lack of document and physical security at shipping ports around the 
country.114 During the yearlong investigation, this group stole nearly 500 cars and sold 
them in New York, New Jersey, Georgia, and Texas, as well as exporting many to West 
African countries.115  
The results of the investigation were impressive. Authorities arrested 17 
perpetrators and recovered 99 vehicles, with a total value exceeding $5,000,000.00.116 Of 
the 99 vehicles recovered, 67 were stolen from New York City.117 The stealing and 
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illegal export of vehicles has a long history, but the strategic value of this investigation 
was in the unraveling the operations of an innovative criminal organization by involving 
the crime solving skills of various federal and local agencies. As a result of the 
investigation, NYPD detectives began to capitalize on the additional investigative steps 
they had discovered in this investigation. Investigators learned that by seeking permission 
to go outside their jurisdictions, visiting seaports, and by outsourcing leads to their 
federal counterparts, they were more effective than they might otherwise have been. 
These actions allowed detectives to address the entire criminal enterprise structure rather 
than just focusing on the local network alone. In addition, investigations grew upward to 
a network focal point, which both dismantled the group and effectively prosecuted the 
entire organization. Furthermore, investigators continued investigate, pursue, and recover 
stolen vehicles in the metropolitan New York area and at the Port of New York and New 
Jersey. In several instances, investigators traveled to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Miami 
to identify and recover vehicles from New York City, and they also assisted other 
investigative units.  
Also, the successes of Operation Steals for Senegal resulted in permanent 
assignment of two fulltime NYPD detectives to the NY BEST. Moreover, NYPD 
investigators now assigned to NY BEST began to focus exclusively on stolen vehicles at 
nearby seaports. Not only did they focus on the Port of New York and New Jersey, they 
were also collaborating with auto crime investigators from other states and expand 
lessons learned from the operation. They also began to focus on other states on the East 
Coast, specifically regarding exports to West African countries. In addition, they had 
consulted with investigators from the National Insurance Crime Bureau, as well as 
security departments at all the major motor vehicle corporation headquarters such as a 
public safety outreach and shipping lines in an attempt to develop confidential 
informants. 
2. Operation Auto Intercept 
On May 23, 2012, prosecutors and law enforcement authorities in Newark, New 
Jersey held a joint news conference to announce the successful completion of Operation 
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Auto-Intercept.118 Auto-Intercept was a case involving federal, state, and local authorities 
investigating a major international car-theft ring stealing high-end vehicles and exporting 
them to West Africa.119 The investigation involved more than 10 law enforcement 
agencies and resulted in the arrests of 19 people. The investigation lasted approximately 
18 months and led to the recovery of more than 200 vehicles, estimated to be worth more 
than six million dollars.120 Of those 200-plus recovered vehicles, it is estimated that 10 
percent of those were the result of carjackings, an often violent and potentially deadly 
method of obtaining a vehicle. Those responsible for using such violent methods to 
obtain vehicles are usually gang members or their associates, according to New Jersey’s 
U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman.121 In describing this operation, Fishman stated,  
The joint law enforcement investigation found that numerous people had 
worked to illegally export, or attempt to export, stolen cars through the 
seaports in Newark and Elizabeth, to various countries overseas, including 
to Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Gambia, all in West 
Africa.122  
The gang members involved in this operation sold the vehicles to a second 
criminal layer known as a fence. The fence purchased the vehicles from the thieves, 
stored them, holding the vehicles at a secure location in an attempt to hide them from law 
enforcement.123 While the fence held the vehicles, he removed the VINs and fabricated 
counterfeit titles. The final step in the process involved the coordinated efforts to export 
the vehicle using a non-vessel operating common carrier (NVOCC) using falsified 
shipping documents.124  
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3. Operation Summer Rental 
On September 21, 2012, investigators from NY BEST received a call from the 
Hertz Rental Car Company requesting assistance in attempting to recover two expensive 
vehicles. The vehicles had an onboard global positioning satellite (GPS) installed and 
were “pinging” in a warehouse located in New Jersey. NYPD contacted its counterparts 
in New Jersey and learned that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police 
Department (PAPD) was at the warehouse and had detained two individuals. NY BEST 
investigators went to the warehouse to assist with the investigation and discovered 
evidence of a large-scale stolen vehicle export scheme.  
NY BEST investigators consulted with PAPD investigators and all parties agreed 
that this investigation met the criteria for federal prosecution. NY BEST investigators 
met with prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York 
(EDNY) and presented the facts and evidence. EDNY accepted prosecution of the case 
and began to sort through the evidence. Investigators were able to track down six 
containers, which had been approved and processed by USCBP for export to Benin, West 
Africa. Working with USCBP, investigators determined that all six shipping containers 
had already been exported. Furthermore, investigators determined that the manifests, 
which were provided to USCBP, indicated that all vehicles contained within the shipping 
containers were carrying “salvage” motor vehicles.125 The vehicle documents provided to 
USCBP included manifests and salvage titles. The shipping containers had not been 
inspected for authenticity prior to export.  
As part of a task force, NYPD investigators checked federal export databases 
(such as the Automated Export System [AES]) and determined the containers had not yet 
reached the ports of West Africa. Through their USCBP counterparts, they immediately 
requested that the shipping containers to be returned to the United States. This was made 
possible in part through improved and expanded relationships between partner agencies.  
When the containers arrived back at the port of Newark, investigators discovered 
18 rental vehicles, which had been illegally exported. The recovery included 14 vehicles 
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recovered on behalf of Hertz Corporation, three vehicles recovered on behalf of Avis 
Corporation, two vehicles recovered on behalf of Enterprise Corporation, and one vehicle 
recovered on behalf of Dollar Corporation.126 Criminals rented these vehicles from 
several states, including Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, with fraudulent 
Canadian documents. The estimation of the dollar amount of vehicles recovered was in 
excess of $1,000,000.00 and included luxury name brands such as Mercedes, Infinity, 
and Cadillac.127  
4. Operation Jacked 
According to a 2014 article in the South Passaic Daily Voice,  
An international ring stole and carjacked luxury vehicles in New Jersey 
and New York and shipped them to West Africa, where they sold for 
significantly above the sticker price here, authorities said today in 
announcing a takedown of the operation and the recovery of 140 cars 
worth more than $8 million.128  
Operation Jacked began after 208 carjackings occurred in New Jersey in 2007. 
This number increased by almost 75 percent to 345 carjackings in 2012 Newark alone.129 
By 2013, the numbers climbed again to 475 carjackings.130 In one of the carjackings, 
thieves were attempting to steal a new Range Rover from a young attorney who was 
Christmas shopping at an affluent mall with his fiancée when he was murdered for the 
vehicle.131 Criminologists and law enforcement experts attribute the rise of carjackings in 
Newark and surrounding counties to the proximity of the nearby seaports located in 
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Newark and Elizabeth.132 Criminals placed most of the carjacked vehicles in containers 
in New York and shipped them out of local ports.133  
New Jersey auto-crime investigators sought the assistance of NY BEST after 
criminals stole vehicles from their jurisdiction and delivered them to layover locations in 
New York.134 Investigators eventually established a link between New York and New 
Jersey, allowing New Jersey investigators to focus directly on identified subjects 
committing the carjackings while New York investigators could assist with layover 
locations and locations where the vehicles were loaded into containers. Although law 
enforcement agencies in both states had respective geographic boundaries and challenges, 
collaboration across state lines allowed investigators to maximize resources.  
Of the roughly 160 vehicles recovered, investigators recovered 140 of them at 
ports in Newark, New Jersey and Staten Island, New York.135 According to officials, 
“shippers who sent cars across the ocean completed false bills of lading, misrepresenting 
the contents of the containers.”136  
D. RELEVANCE TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
This case study of the NY BEST illustrates that the NYPD and law enforcement 
partners across state lines have successfully undertaken several operations using several 
strategies to address the international export of stolen vehicles. These strategies consist of 
multiple levels of enforcement cooperation and collaboration across state lines and with 
key national enforcement agencies. The evidence is clear that NYPD has been able to 
reduce the number of stolen vehicles exported from the port of New York and New 
Jersey. The case study illuminates the domestic nature of the stolen motor vehicle 
problem, but it fails to provide clear evidence that exported stolen vehicles support 
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international terrorist incidents. The next chapter provides a systematic analysis of the 
NYPD case study and compares that to findings in the literature.  
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III. ANALYSIS 
The literature review and the case study (the investigative work of NY BEST) 
demonstrate that the monetary value of illegal vehicle exports total several millions of 
dollars each year—in New York and surrounding areas alone. The case study also 
revealed no specific evidence to support a link to international terrorism, but given the 
large amount of money involved and the criminal networks engaged, it is reasonable to 
assume that a portion of these millions could finance several terrorist operations. Both the 
literature review and the case study point to shipping fraud as the unsolved portion of the 
stolen vehicle export problem. In some cases, it is simple deception and the stolen 
vehicles are hidden in containers and shipped illegally without any title or other 
documentation. However, in many other cases, vehicles are hidden in containers with 
legitimate commodities, such as household goods bound for export. In other cases, 
criminals export high-end luxury vehicles illegally using authentic salvage vehicle titles 
and relying upon customs officials not inspecting the container prior to export.137  
A. THE DECEPTION PROBLEM 
It is practically impossible to stop all instances of the illegal exportation of stolen 
vehicles. This is in part because criminal networks realize a high return on their efforts, 
and thus they find the reward well worth the risk, in part because these vehicles are often 
placed in containers with legitimate cargo, which makes it very difficult for law 
enforcement to interdict the illicit merchandise.138 In 2017, a massive car theft scheme 
was uncovered in Liberia, where 39 vehicles stolen from the United States were being 
used to operate Oragon Rent-A-Car International, a car rental company in operation since 
2013.139 The U.S. Embassy in Monrovia sought the assistance of Liberian authorities 
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after U.S. officials became aware of the scheme.140 Investigators in Liberia identified 
deception practices involving false customs manifests, fraudulent vehicle titles, and 
improper VIN numbers.141 They also speculate that corrupt officials, such as port 
workers and Liberian lawmakers, were involved in the scheme and a potential cover-up 
among Liberian officials, thus the need for a special prosecutor was recommended.142 It 
is estimated the vehicle dollar value recovered was over $300,000, and it is said that 
some of the stolen vehicles were obtained via car jackings from cities in the United 
States.143  
In the stolen vehicle chain of events, the export process involves exporters, freight 
forwarders, non-vessel common carriers (NVOCCs), and shipping lines.144 Shipping 
lines sell space on their vessels (known as “berths”) to NVOCCs, who in turn sell that 
space to freight forwarders and exporters. The exporter then contacts the freight 
forwarder, also known as the NVOCC,145 to arrange for a shipping container delivery for 
loading. Once the container has been loaded, the exporter arranges for the container to be 
transported to the port for export. It is at this point where the deception/false 
manifestation takes place. If authorities inspect the container and find stolen vehicles, the 
non-complicit freight forwarder is technically held responsible; however, these cases are 
extremely difficult to prove and penalties are light enough that criminals are willing to 
risk being caught.146  
In an effort to improve the export filing procedures, the U.S. Census Department 
implemented a new computerized system, the Automated Export System (AES),147 
which is designed to collect data when exporters fill out an electronic export information 
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(EEI) form online.148 The new EEI computer form replaces a paper version, called the 
shippers export declaration form, allowing U.S exporters to electronically file their 
exports and enabling federal agencies to monitor and validate exports.149 The freight 
forwarder then files those documents with USCBP for processing. For vehicle exports, 
USCBP physically examines vehicle titles and other documents, such as lien releases and 
power of attorney for authenticity, and manually processes them to be cleared for export; 
however, ships have often sailed before customs can verify the exported vehicles 
paperwork due to the sheer volume of paperwork waiting to be cleared.150 Although the 
filing procedures have improved since 2001, seizures at ports throughout the country 
show that there are still deception practices.  
It is simply unrealistic and too costly to physically inspect all shipping containers 
awaiting export. In an effort to address the deception practices used by criminal 
networks, USCBP officials have employed the use of x-ray devices to scan containers 
suspected of containing non-manifested vehicles.151 If authorities find containers with 
contraband, such as stolen vehicles, they can impose fines against the freight forwarder as 
both punishment and deterrent.152  
As the NYPD case study demonstrates, fines, arrests, and targeted enforcement 
are simply not enough to address this problem, and unfortunately, there are no easy 
solutions. As total vehicle thefts have declined in the United States, evidence suggests 
that this crime has moved to illegal exports at border and seaport regions.153 Even so, 
criminal reliance on deception methods will likely continue as targeted enforcement 
efforts continue to be disruptive. Clarke and Brown suggest that what we need is an 
“urgent priority for research to uncover the methods by which traffickers circumvent 
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registration and licensing requirements, and avoid detection at customs and border 
checkpoints.”154 Other authors and organizations have called for further research and 
study in this problematic part of the export process.155 
B. THE SALVAGE PROBLEM 
Recent natural disasters, such as hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Sandy, have 
resulted in insurance companies writing off cars as total losses due to flood damage. The 
National Insurance Crime Bureau (NCIB) reported over 637,000 insurance claims related 
to just hurricanes Harvey and Irma alone.156 Insurance companies pay out these vehicles 
as total losses and sell them to salvage auction companies. Insurance Auto Auctions has 
tens of thousands of flooded vehicles listed on its website, and Copart lists more than 
30,000 vehicles from hurricane Harvey alone at two locations in Texas.157 Potential 
buyers can utilize the NCIB, Vincheck, and NMVTIS to check VIN history; however, not 
all insurance companies support all these databases.158 In addition, only 38 states comply 
with the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, which requires motor vehicle title data and its 
history to be reported to the federal system before a new title is issued.159 
Further complicating matters is the fact that not all states define salvage in the 
same way. The lack of uniform definitions of salvage and related terms allows a person 
or business to manipulate the system utilizing a scam known as “title washing.” Title 
washing happens when a person submits a salvage vehicle title to a different state motor 
vehicle office and that motor vehicle office issues a new, “clean” title, omitting the 
salvage notation. For example, a person can buy a salvage branded vehicle at a very low 
cost and repair the vehicle. The person then brings this vehicle title, which was branded, 
to another state that does not recognize the term “salvage.” The new state then issues a 
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new title without the salvage branding on it, in effect, creating a new, clean title. A 
recently published article by the Huffington Post blames the lack of a federal car titling 
laws for the national title washing problem.160 Regardless of the reason, it is obvious that 
title washing is easier in a nation in which each state motor vehicle title is unique. 
C. THE STOLEN VEHICLE EXPORT PROBLEM AS A SYSTEMS 
FAILURE WITH UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES 
This thesis has analyzed the stolen vehicle problem in the United States and 
described how this domestic criminal problem has shifted to an international problem 
with possible ramifications for funding international criminal organizations, including 
terrorist organizations. The 1992 Anti Car Theft Act effectively reduced the number of 
stolen vehicles, but the failure to completely implement its provisions for uniform vehicle 
titles has left open the door for illegal exports of stolen vehicles. The literature review 
detailed how federal laws and state reluctance to implement those laws has hampered 
efforts to reduce the number of stolen vehicles exported from several U.S. ports. The 
NYPD case study described how this major metropolitan police department built 
collaborative strategic partnerships with federal, state, and local authorities to 
successfully target and convict illegal exporters. In the face of failed policies and 
aggressive enforcement, the export of stolen vehicles remains a significant problem that 
is funding international criminal organizations, perhaps including terrorist organizations. 
The final chapter of this thesis addresses these issues and make concrete policy and 
enforcement recommendations that can effectively reduce the number of stolen vehicles 
exported from the United States. 
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This thesis began with a description of a problem, the exportation of stolen 
vehicles from The United States, and three research questions designed to unpack the 
problem space in relation to possible policy changes to more effectively secure the 
homeland. The first question was specific to strategic police operations at the Port of 
New York and New Jersey. The second question focuses on policy implications of the 
NYPD case study and its impact on the current export process. The final research 
question asked about the relationship between exported stolen vehicles and international 
terrorism. Below is a summary of those findings, the specific policy implications and 
suggestions that emerge from the research as well as a look at how the specific research 
questions are answered by the evidence that is analyzed.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Do the targeted strategic police operations of the NYPD BEST unit reduce the 
number of vehicles stolen in port area of New York and New Jersey? The simple answer 
is that the evidence is inconclusive. The case study described several successful 
operations that thwarted international car theft rings and provided information on the 
number of cars recovered. These enforcement actions do correctly point out that targeted 
enforcement in this area yield positive results, as recommended by Lantsman.161 
However, none of the research revealed any actual numbers or even any estimates of the 
total number of stolen vehicles exported from the Port of New York and New Jersey, or 
for that matter at any U.S. port. However, as the research shows, these targeted NYPD 
enforcement activities did result in a significant increase in the recovery of stolen 
vehicles, demonstrating that these kinds of targeted enforcement strategies can have a 
measureable impact. What the research does not demonstrate is the impact these 
strategies have on the overall number of exported stolen vehicles.  
The inability to secure definitive information on the total number of stolen 
vehicles exported from the Port of New York and New Jersey is not unique. No local, 
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state, or federal entity is currently working to find that information. Instead, their focus is 
on securing imports, especially in light of the post-9/11threat, and this has overshadowed 
considerations about these illegal and dangerous exports. The permissive security 
environment in major ports contributes to the overall dangerous stolen vehicle challenge 
faced in New York, and New Jersey as well as other jurisdictions with access to ports.  
Did these policy insights from the New York and New Jersey case study point to 
more general policy changes that could make it more difficult for criminal enterprises to 
export stolen vehicles? The answer is yes. The case study provided examples of the tools 
used by illegal exporters and why current policies make it practically impossible to 
circumvent their efforts to move and ship stolen vehicles.  
Targeted operations like those of the NYPD BEST unit clearly force these illegal 
exporters to “port shop,” which means they move from port to port, exploiting loopholes 
in exporting processes. Consistent application of suggested national policies can 
eliminate the advantages of port shopping to these criminals. By reducing the port 
shopping advantage, the government contributes to a more secure jurisdictional 
environment. Also, the research makes it clear that illegal exporters take advantage of the 
fact that USCBP focuses on imports not exports. That focus can be balanced somewhat 
with updated policies to enhance the ability of customs officials to verify exported goods. 
Finally, this thesis asked the question of whether it is possible to demonstrate how 
a connection between organized crime and the use of exported stolen vehicles can aid 
terrorism activities? So far, the answer is no. The literature review shows that the 
evidence about the connection is limited and mostly anecdotal. As the United States 
continues to formulate homeland security policies to reduce the risks for terrorism, it 
would be advantageous to look at ways to address the stolen vehicle export problem. Its 
exact impact may as yet be undefined, but we cannot afford to ignore a risk that has clear 
implications for our national security. Just because we have not found the connection 
does not mean it does not exist. Given the relative and lucrative ease of exporting stolen 
vehicles, the issue merits closer examination.  
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B. HOMELAND SECURITY RAMIFICATIONS 
Once a vehicle is stolen, it can quickly escalate from a purely local law 
enforcement problem to a problem for a myriad of local, state, and federal agencies as the 
vehicle is transferred from criminal to criminal over state and international boundaries. 
The literature review examined how public policies and federal agencies, like USCBP, 
have inadvertently created loopholes for criminals who steal vehicles to ship them from 
large U.S. ports. The NYPD case study demonstrated that even a local law enforcement 
agency as large as NYPD is challenged to adequately address the problem. This raises the 
question of how much more difficult the challenge is for a jurisdiction or agency with 
less resources. 
Because the exporting of stolen vehicles has become very lucrative, some 
researchers have suggested that the United States should “become more interested in the 
use of stolen vehicles as a hard asset in financing and supporting terrorist activities.”162 
The idea that terrorists could use these monies to finance a single or multiple terrorist 
attacks is neither inconceivable nor farfetched. As a result of 9/11, financial transactions 
are now tracked on an international level to determine if the money is flowing to known 
international or terrorist organizations.163 Stolen vehicles can be quickly converted to 
cash thus removing any serious opportunity to effectively track the money. Policy makers 
should give consideration to developing national policies that recognize the exporting of 
stolen vehicles as a national security concern.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The literature review has made it clear that we need to better assess the size of the 
exported stolen vehicle problem and its impact on international crime and international 
terrorism. This is as true for local enforcement efforts as it is for those at the national 
security strategy and planning levels. This research was hindered by the daunting fact that 
there is inadequate knowledge regarding the total number of vehicles taken illegally from 
U.S. borders. Enforcement agencies have data on stolen vehicles that are recovered, but 
                                                 
162 Ibid., 159.  
163 Ibid., 176.  
 44 
the vehicles recovered data is only a proxy measure of the overall problem since it 
provides the numerator but not the denominator in equating relative value.164  
An analysis of the criminal structures and law enforcement agencies involved in 
this problem suggests there are other ways to collect more accurate quantitative 
information including insurance company data on reported auto thefts and secure U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection data. Some research on the subject has been qualitative 
and at least one researcher, Resendiz, has conducted interviews with active vehicle thieves 
involved in exporting vehicles to other countries.165 The increased use of qualitative data 
will help provide insight and understanding about the relationship between vehicle thefts 
and connections to organized criminal activities impacting homeland security.  
Future research should continue to investigate to determine if there is a linkage 
between exported stolen vehicles and international terrorism. This thesis establishes that 
there is little research on this subject. The critical analysis of the extant literature on the 
subject includes references estimating the value of vehicles recovered in the port of New 
York/New Jersey as being in the tens of millions each year. Given that there are many 
other large U.S. ports, it is not unreasonable to increase that lost value number several 
times. With so much money involved, it is important that research focus on following the 
money trail financing these organized criminal operations and specifically look at how 
that money is used to finance other activities, such as international terrorism.  
D. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS  
The protection of our homeland requires the United States to be vigilant on many 
fronts. One area needing immediate attention is the exporting of stolen motor vehicles. 
This thesis examined threats posed by the loopholes in the current system through the 
lens of one large urban police department, NYPD. The thesis has clearly identified 
vulnerabilities and inadequacies within the export system and offers solutions for 
stakeholders to consider. At the very least, homeland security agencies at all levels of 
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government should address the need to increase the inspection of the number of outbound 
containers, enhance scrutiny of freight forwarders, and address the disparity between 
import and export inspections. At the national policy level, the United States should 
enhance NMVTIS so that all titling agencies are participating, allowing those agencies to 
instantly and accurately verify the information from a scannable, machine readable paper 
title with the electronically stored state issued title. The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 
stipulates grant monies are available for the states to use and the use of such funds could 
further assist researchers to study the lack of uniformity of vehicle titles among the states. 
Every state and territory has its own unique vehicle title, which is problematic for 
USCBP processing vehicle exports and also vehicle document fraud in the United States. 
Ideally, USCBP should have the ability to electronically scan all state issued vehicle titles 
for export and then be able to cross-reference and link them to NMVTIS and NICB 
computer systems.  
These recommendations emphasize changes at the program, policy, and 
enforcement levels, which can improve U.S. efforts to stem the number of stolen vehicles 
exported at major ports. Although they do imply the need for systems level change, 
funding constraints suggest that adjustments in current programs and policies should 
offer the best opportunity to make progress in this area. 
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